Yield

Yield

On the framework's own basis — adjusted free cash flow (reported FCF less stock-based compensation less the 5-year average of acquisition spend) — Comcast generates roughly $20.0 billion in FY2025, a 24.2% yield on today's $82.7 billion market cap. Against the 10% reference line that a moderate balance sheet (net debt 2.4× EBITDA) selects, every measure clears: 19.4% on the three-year average, ~15–17% on normalized cash flow, and ~14% on consensus forward FCF after the same adjustments. FY2025's figure is inflated by a low cash-tax year; the normalized read still sits well above the line.

The adjustment, line by line

The deterministic feature file returns adjusted_fcf as not computable — the structured cash-flow feed dropped the share-based-compensation line for every year, so the derivation could not run (see the note below). The adjustment is rebuilt here directly from the filed 10-K cash-flow statements, where SBC and acquisitions are both disclosed.

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Adjusted FCF = reported FCF − SBC − trailing 5-fiscal-year average acquisition spend; derived from company filings. Reported FCF and SBC per the FY2025 10-K cash-flow statement [1] and the FY2023 10-K for FY2021–FY2022 [2].

Reported free cash flow ran $21.9 billion in FY2025, up from a $15.5–16.3 billion band across FY2022–FY2024 [3]. The two deductions the framework requires are small relative to the base. Share-based compensation is modest for a company this size — $1,288 million in FY2025, essentially flat since FY2021 [4] — about 0.9% of dilution-adjusted market cap, not the compounding share-issuance problem that disqualifies serial diluters. Acquisitions have been light: $1,306 million in FY2025, $119 million in FY2024, zero in FY2023, $12 million in FY2022, and $1,374 million in FY2021, a five-year average of $562 million [5]. That window deliberately excludes the ~$39 billion Sky purchase (FY2018), which sits outside the trailing five years; the recent record is tuck-ins, so the adjustment removes roughly $1.85 billion a year and leaves adjusted FCF at $20.0 billion for FY2025.

The yield, three ways

Current Adjusted Yield (FY2025)

24.2%

3-Year Average

19.4%

Normalized (mid-cycle)

15.5%

Adjusted FCF ÷ market cap of $82.7B (3,709M shares at $22.295, 24 Jul 2026; fit_features.market_cap.native). Adjusted FCF derived from FY2021–FY2025 10-K cash-flow statements [6].

The current-year yield of 24.2% ($20.0B ÷ $82.7B) is the headline, but FY2025 is the strongest cash-flow year in the series and should not be read as the run-rate. The three-year average adjusted FCF of $16.0 billion (FY2023–FY2025) yields 19.4% on the same market cap — a cleaner read that already dampens the FY2025 spike. The normalized figure, worked below, lands near 15–16%. The three converge on the same conclusion: at today's price the yield sits far above the 10% moderate-balance-sheet reference line, whichever basis is used.

Is this a jump from a stable baseline? The feature file's yield_baseline is also not computable (it needs fiscal-year-end prices the run did not carry), so the jump test is estimated from the drawdown rather than measured. The stock fell from $45.14 on 6 Nov 2024 to $22.30, a 51% decline (fit_features.capitulation_gauge). At the November-2024 peak, roughly $176 billion of market cap, the same normalized ~$13–14 billion of adjusted FCF yielded about 7.5–8%; at today's $82.7 billion it yields ~16%. The yield has roughly doubled on price alone, which meets the framework's ≥2× jump signature — though as an estimate, not a computed baseline. Comcast is not the classic fortress "stable 3.5–4% suddenly at 9%" name; it is a moderate-leverage cable and media operator that had already de-rated, and the fear leg roughly doubled an already-elevated yield.

Which bar applies

The reference line is selected by the balance sheet. The computation, from the FY2025 10-K:

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Total debt of $98.9B (current $5,958M + noncurrent $92,979M) and cash of $9,481M per the FY2025 balance sheet [7] and Note 6 Debt [8]; consolidated Adjusted EBITDA of $37,384M per the 10-K reconciliation [9].

The feature file returns balance_sheet_class as unknown because the structured feed lacked a debt figure, so this too is rebuilt from the filing. Net debt of $89.5 billion against $37.4 billion of Adjusted EBITDA is 2.4× — inside the framework's moderate band (fortress at or below 0.5×; levered at or above 3.0×) [10]. The moderate class carries the 10% bar, judged on the three-year average and an underwritable forward. Comcast is neither a net-cash fortress (which would lower the line to 8–9%) nor a levered cable operator like Charter (which would raise it to 25%). At 19.4% on the three-year average against the 10% line, the yield runs roughly 940 basis points ahead of the bar; even the ~15–16% normalized figure sits ~500–600 basis points ahead.

Normalized mid-cycle yield

Comcast is not meaningfully cyclical in the way a bank or a commodity producer is — broadband, wireless and business connectivity are subscription revenue, and the media and parks segments add only modest sensitivity to advertising and attendance. The distortion in FY2025 is not economic; it is a cash-tax timing swing. Cash income taxes paid fell to $755 million in FY2025 from $7,096 million in FY2024 [11], roughly a $6 billion under-payment that inflates FY2025 operating cash flow and reverses as deferred taxes unwind.

Two independent normalizations bracket the run-rate. Anchoring to the FY2022–FY2024 reported FCF average of $15.8 billion, less $1.3 billion SBC and $0.6 billion acquisitions, gives normalized adjusted FCF of about $14.0 billion — a 16.9% yield. Anchoring instead to consensus forward FCF (FY2026–FY2029 average of $14.2 billion, below), less the same $1.85 billion of adjustments, gives about $12.3 billion — a 14.9% yield. The mid-cycle read is therefore ~$12.3–14.0 billion of adjusted FCF, a 15–17% yield, comfortably above the 10% line. A skeptic who instead treated FY2025's low-tax FCF as sustainable would arrive at 24%; one who assumed cash taxes snap all the way back to the FY2024 $7 billion level would still land near 13–14%. The conclusion holds across the window.

The consensus check

The relevant CapIQ series is consensus free cash flow (mean estimate), the closest direct proxy the vendor carries; fit_features.consensus_forward_yield sources it from the estimates feed dated 25 July 2026.

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Consensus free cash flow (mean), per fit_features.consensus_forward_yield, sourced from CapIQ estimates (data/sp/estimates.json, 25 Jul 2026); yields computed on the current $82.7B market cap.

Consensus forward free cash flow — the sell side's own numbers, not the buy side's fear — runs $13.3–15.6 billion a year through FY2029, a 16.1–18.8% gross yield on today's market cap. Subtracting the same SBC and acquisition adjustments (~$1.85 billion) leaves adjusted forward FCF near $11.5–13.7 billion, a ~14–17% adjusted yield that still clears the 10% bar on every forecast year. The framework's reading of this configuration is explicit: when consensus forward FCF also clears the bar, the sell side already agrees on the cash flow and the discount is fear, not a disputed forecast. That is the case here — no mean-reversion underwrite is required, because consensus never dips below the line. The one caveat is direction: consensus FCF steps down from the FY2025 actual (~$16.9 billion) to ~$13.3 billion by FY2027 before recovering, consistent with cash taxes normalizing and video subscribers declining. The bar is cleared on the trough forecast, so the setup does not depend on a recovery that has to be argued.

FCF/revenue trend

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FCF ÷ revenue; derived from FY2021–FY2025 reported financials — cash-flow statement [12] and income statement [13]; FY2021 revenue of $116,385M per the FY2023 10-K [14].

Free-cash-flow conversion has held in a 12.5–17.7% band of revenue across the five years, with no downward drift: 17.2% (FY2021), 13.0% (FY2022), 13.4% (FY2023), 12.5% (FY2024), 17.7% (FY2025) [15]. Conversion is stable, which supports rather than undercuts the yield case — the framework's concern is a deteriorating FCF/EBITDA or FCF/revenue trend that would signal the flat-to-up underwrite is failing, and that is not present here. The offsetting fact belongs alongside it: revenue itself is essentially flat, $116.4 billion in FY2021 to $123.7 billion in FY2025 (~1.5% a year) and down fractionally in FY2025 [16]. Stable conversion on flat revenue keeps cash flow steady but leaves no organic growth tailwind; whether the top line can hold is the durability question examined in Durability, and the pending Versant separation of the cable networks will reshape the reported entity. On yield alone, the cash is real, consistent, and priced at a double-digit discount to the framework's line.